Following the failure at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, where the body failed to adopt a consensus outcome document for the third consecutive time, a prominent arms control expert is calling for a tactical shift. Rather than mourning the impasse, global policy leaders are urged to implement an immediate alternative strategy to prevent the collapse of international stability.
Patricia Jaworek, a director with the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) Global Nuclear Policy Program (GNPP), reflected on the increasingly precarious state of international disarmament. While she stressed that the lack of a consensus document does not mean the historic treaty’s immediate collapse, she noted that the erosion of trust between nuclear-armed states and the rest of the world has reached a critical threshold.
“The failure to adopt a consensus outcome document for the third time in a row is disappointing but not surprising,” Jaworek stated, pointing directly to the volatile political landscape forming the backdrop of modern diplomacy. “The Review Conference took place in one of the most difficult geopolitical environments since the entry into force of the NPT.”
Jaworek outlined an array of destabilizing global flashpoints that effectively paralyzed negotiations, including Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, U.S. attacks on Iran, and Iran’s continued non-compliance with its safeguards obligations.
This is compounded by China’s rapid nuclear modernization and the expiration of the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia.
According to Jaworek, these systemic pressures are directly fracturing the core foundation upon which global non-proliferation was built.
“The NPT’s grand bargain is central to the treaty: non-nuclear-weapon states agree to forgo nuclear weapons in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technology and a commitment by nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament,” Jaworek explained. “When that bargain appears increasingly one-sided, confidence in the regime inevitably erodes.”
To preserve the treaty’s relevance before the next formal review conference in 2031, Jaworek emphasized that the international community cannot simply wait out the gridlock. Instead, diplomats must actively seek out areas where diplomatic alignment remains intact.
“We must identify where common ground still exists,” Jaworek urged. “For example, the reaffirmation of moratoria against the resumption of explosive nuclear testing, norms against proliferation, and the preservation of the ‘nuclear taboo’.”
Sustaining this momentum will require a relentless commitment to communication, even among bitter adversaries. Jaworek called for stakeholders to “sustain engagement and dialogue over the next five years, including re-energising dialogue between nuclear-armed states, especially in the P5 format”.
When asked how non-nuclear-weapon states can break the great-power gridlock, Jaworek pointed to a highly potent yet frequently overlooked diplomatic asset: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs).
Currently covering Latin America, Africa, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, these zones represent unified regional blocks that have legally banned the development and deployment of atomic weapons within their borders.
“Nuclear-weapon-free zones remain one of the most underappreciated tools in the non-proliferation and disarmament regime,” Jaworek observed. “Each of the five zones emerged from complicated geopolitical realities and represented a deliberate choice to reject nuclear weapons.”
Jaworek argued that this regional resolve offers a powerful counter-narrative to modern great-power competition, providing a roadmap for smaller countries that feel exposed by the current nuclear arms race.
“This is a narrative that matters not only to the P5, but also to countries caught in the crosshairs of great power competition as they reconsider the role of nuclear weapons for their national security,” she noted.
By banding together, these regions can shift from passive observers to active drivers of global policy.
“Strengthening NWFZs through the leadership of non-nuclear-weapon states and collaboration between the zones to leverage their collective voice can create pressure on nuclear-weapon states and their allies within the next review cycle,” Jaworek stated.
With the next NPT review conference not until 2031, Jaworek warned that the intervening years carry immense risk. According to her, if regional conflicts are left to fester without diplomatic intervention, they will likely spill over into the NPT forum once again, sealing its gridlock.
“Regional conflicts and tensions have been one of the main challenges at the past three review conferences—specifically involving the Middle East, Russia-Ukraine, and the United States-Israel-Iran dynamics,” Jaworek pointed out. “Without resolutions to these conflicts, and with tensions increasing in other regions, there’s a risk that the security environment will further deteriorate and block any progress in the next review cycle.”
Compounding these traditional geopolitical risks is a highly unpredictable wild card in the shape of a rapid militarisation of advanced computing.
“The issue of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies has become a major topic of discussion, and there are major differences between states parties on how to approach this within the NPT regime,” Jaworek explained. “With how rapidly the technologies and their integration with nuclear systems are developing, this will be an important issue to watch during the next review cycle.”
