The eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded today without agreement on a consensus outcome document, even as the international community faces mounting and interrelated threats — from the spectre of nuclear weapons use in active conflicts, to attacks on nuclear facilities, to the destabilising implications of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.
Despite four weeks of meetings and negotiations, delegates were unable to bridge outstanding differences and reach a consensus outcome — marking the third consecutive Conference to fail to do so.
The NPT is a cornerstone international agreement aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear disarmament and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Built on those three pillars, it requires non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear arms, while nuclear-weapon States commit to pursuing disarmament under Article VI.
Entered into force in 1970 and now with 191 States parties, the NPT is reviewed every five years to assess its implementation and progress. Despite its near-universal membership and continued legal force, the Treaty is currently under strain, with recent review cycles failing to reach consensus.
Conference President Do Hung Viet (Viet Nam) affirmed that he had put forward “four versions of the draft outcome document, all of which have been painstakingly revised in line with States parties wishes”, culminating in document NPT/CONF.2026/CRP.2/Rev.4. However, he voiced regret that, after weeks of “intensive engagement”, “years of preparatory work” and “despite our best efforts”, the Conference was “not in a position to achieve agreement on its substantive work”.
“My goal was to make everyone equally unhappy,” he said, implying the difficult compromises required: “I think we can all agree that I had made some progress towards that goal.”
Draft Outcome Document Reflects ‘Best Effort’
The document reflected best efforts to capture the range of views expressed across the Treaty’s three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the strengthened review process, in an approach that “sought to be inclusive”.
While assuring delegates that the document had been “a genuine attempt to find common ground”, he did not put the document forward for adoption.
Yet, he affirmed, “delegations do share the goal of a world without nuclear weapons — a world in which the threat of nuclear war does not hang over our heads, or those of our children — even if we differ on how to reach that goal”. However, “if we cannot agree on which road to take, we will never arrive at our destination”, he stressed.
Noting that the “NPT is an old treaty” with mechanics that have not been updated in some 26 years, he accented: “At that age, even some of the best machines can start to creak.” He then voiced hope that “States Parties will heed my advice” and “reinvigorate this Treaty as a central tool in addressing modern threats”.
Taking Teeth Out of Ambitious Initial Proposal
Compared with the initial draft circulated at an earlier stage of the Conference, the fourth revised text took the form of a shorter thematic document organised around nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, the Middle East, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the strengthened review process.
The most significant changes appeared in the nuclear disarmament section. While “Rev.4” retained references to Article VI obligations, the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, strategic risk reduction, verification, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) entry into force, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a number of stronger formulations contained in the initial draft no longer appeared.
Removed or weakened language included references to the urgency of nuclear disarmament; the principle that indefinite extension does not imply indefinite possession; criticism of arsenal modernisation and expansion; no first use; a New START successor; low-yield and subcritical testing; dismantling or conversion of fissile-material facilities; fissile-material production moratoriums; and stronger formulations on legally binding negative security assurances.
“Rev.4” placed greater emphasis on dialogue, transparency and strategic risk-reduction measures. The revised text included more detailed references to confidence-building measures, crisis communications, military-to-military engagement, discussions of the risks and benefits of emerging technologies, and voluntary measures to reduce the risks of miscalculation, misperception, and miscommunication.
Concurrently, references contained in the initial draft to maintaining human control over nuclear weapons and to measures mitigating risks related to nuclear weapons and emerging technologies, including “the entanglement of conventional and strategic forces, and interference in communications and command and control”, were dropped.
“Rev.4” retained references to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, environmental remediation, affected communities, and disarmament and non-proliferation education, although the language was weakened or streamlined compared to the initial draft.
References to Specific Countries, Situations Expose Deep Divisions
References to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, which appeared in the initial draft and earlier revisions, were also removed. Likewise, references to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General’s Five Concrete Principles for nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine no longer appeared, although broader language concerning attacks or threats against peaceful nuclear facilities and nuclear safety in armed conflict zones was retained.
Extensive language regarding Iran’s safeguards-related non-compliance findings, undeclared nuclear material and activities, and attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities was replaced with a single bracketed paragraph that included a line that reads that “Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons” — reflecting continued disagreement among delegations. These divisions ultimately derailed last-minute efforts to achieve consensus.
Language concerning nuclear-sharing and extended deterrence arrangements, including expressions of concern regarding possible new arrangements, was removed from “Rev.4”.
States Clash Over Iran, Ukraine, Nuclear Commitments
Many delegations delivered their closing remarks. The representative of the United States proposed transferring paragraphs 37 through 43 from the draft outcome document on strengthening the review process into a separate decision.
He further affirmed that his delegation had been “prepared to join the consensus document that was produced in revision 4”. This was “sadly” not possible as States Parties “were not even allowed to proceed to the option of a consensus because Iran — a prolific Treaty violator — has succeeded in holding Treaty members hostage”. Calling this “disgraceful and embarrassing”, he stressed: “We may have witnessed the end of the relevancy of the Review Conference process.” While Iran refuses to provide IAEA access and information while it “has stockpiled uranium enrichment to levels with no civilian purpose”, it was an embarrassment that “other States Parties bowed to a violator’s demands” — a “peace-in-our-time moment that we will regret”. The United States “is ready for the next generation of arms control”, he affirmed.
Echoing regret over the lack of consensus, the United Kingdom’s representative further condemned Iran for failing to cooperate fully with the IAEA on safeguards for more than two decades, calling on that State to return to “full compliance without delay”.
However, Iran’s representative lamented 168 students “murdered in their classrooms on 28 February” when “the United States and the Israeli regime began their second war of aggression against Iran in less than eight months” — stressing that their lives were not spared because “the perpetrators thought that killing them was more fun”. Two possessors of nuclear weapons attacked Iran, “which obviously had no nuclear activity” and were misusing the Conference to “distort reality” that Iran was “only two weeks away from acquiring a nuclear weapon”, he stressed. Meanwhile, the “[United States], [United Kingdom], France, and the so-called nuclear umbrella States’ refusal to eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a manifest violation of their obligations”.
Turning to the Russian Federation’s “war of aggression against Ukraine”, the representative of the European Union, speaking in its capacity as observer, said that Moscow’s actions undermine all three pillars of the Treaty — particularly through nuclear threats and the illegal seizure and militarisation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in the context of its aggression against Ukraine. He also cited concerns regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes in violation of Security Council resolutions, as well as challenges related to China’s “opaque nuclear build-up”. He also noted that language on safeguards and non-proliferation could have been further strengthened.
Opposition to U.S. Proposal
However, the Russian Federation’s delegate voiced regret that “not all NPT States Parties participated in the conference in the interests of preserving the Treaty, ensuring its sustainability and integrity, and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. He deplored that “a large group of delegations arrived in New York for the sole purpose of settling political scores with their cultural and civilizational opponents”. Yet, despite their attempts to derail the Conference, “the main event of the current review cycle has fulfilled its mandate to review implementation of the NPT”. Expressing deep regret that the draft final document was not tabled for adoption, he nevertheless expressed gratitude for those delegations “that have responded to our call to make every effort to bridge our differences and work together to find common ground.” He rejected the United States’ proposal to remove some provisions from the text.
Also addressing the United States’ proposal, the representative of China noted that selecting “part of the package as a draft decision is not feasible” as it would constitute a “selective approach dealing with various parts of the draft outcome document”. He further expressed regret over the lack of consensus, noting that the result of this Review Conference “further demonstrates that the multilateral arms-control mechanism is not operating in a vacuum,” and that national security environments have implications for its operation. Despite the failure to reach a substantive outcome, “the NPT still remains the cornerstone of international non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament”.
Denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula
For her part, Japan’s delegate recalled that her country remains the only one to have suffered atomic bombings during war. Through the joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education, 116 State Parties were able to send a strong message on the importance of conveying the realities of the use of nuclear weapons beyond borders and generations. “This demonstrates that countries from various regions and with diverse views can build common ground through joint efforts,” she said. Regarding the United States’ proposal, she voiced Tokyo’s support for a separate decision.
The Republic of Korea’s delegate underscored the international community’s “common responsibility” to send a message against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme — stressing firm commitment “to the complete denuclearisation and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula”. However, “we deeply regret that the document was not able to convey even a simple message to the DPRK issue,” he deplored.
In his closing remarks, the President of the Conference addressed the United States’ proposal, noting that, having listened to delegations, “it does not seem that we have consensus on this issue”. The proposal was therefore not adopted.
Inclusive, Transparent Conference, But Take Failures ‘Very Seriously’
At a press conference following the Conference’s closure, Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, expressed appreciation for the leadership and stewardship of the Conference President throughout “these four marathon weeks”.
“All States parties felt that the process was transparent and inclusive, and that everyone’s perspectives were heard and respected,” she said.
“While there was no consensus outcome, we must remember that the legal commitments and obligations under this Treaty remain,” she added.
She then appealed to nuclear-weapon States: “Non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin,” and it is simply wrong for them to assume that non-proliferation obligations will be upheld without their own commitment to and implementation of disarmament obligations under Article VI, she emphasised.
State Parties need to take the three consecutive failures “very seriously” if they want to preserve this regime, she urged.
The next Review Conference will be held in 2031 in New York.
