The draft outcome document of the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has placed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty back in the spotlight, warning that any resumption of nuclear testing would seriously undermine international peace and security and risk triggering a new arms race. It has also sharpened its focus on non-proliferation, reaffirming the central role of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and warning that unresolved cases of non-compliance threaten the treaty’s integrity.
Additionally, the 2026 NPT RevCon draft outcome document has delivered a blunt warning on disarmament, saying the nuclear-weapon states have not made enough progress in meeting their Article VI obligations and calling for stronger action to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and lower the risk of war.
The draft said the CTBT would create a permanent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. It called on states that have not yet ratified the treaty to do so without delay and specifically urges the nine states to take action. The document also welcomed the ratifications by Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, and Papua New Guinea, as well as Somalia’s signature. It commended the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre, which provide the core verification structure for the treaty.
In strong language, the draft underscored the “strategic, political, environmental and humanitarian dangers” of any return to testing. It also calls on nuclear-weapon states to maintain their existing moratoriums on test explosions and to adopt new measures that would restore confidence in those moratoriums.
Secondly, the draft stated that the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of Articles I and II remained essential to the treaty’s effectiveness and to international peace and security. It also reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the non-proliferation regime and that the agency is the competent authority for verifying compliance under Article III.
It expressed serious concern about unresolved safeguards non-compliance and says such concerns should be addressed through peaceful means and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It specifically supported a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear programme and says full and timely cooperation with the IAEA is indispensable to restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of that programme.
The draft also urged more states to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, describing them as important tools for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities. It noted that IAEA safeguards responsibilities are growing while the agency faces financial constraints and called for stronger political, technical and financial support.
The document further linked non-proliferation to export controls, nuclear trade and peaceful cooperation, stressing that nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes must not contribute to weapons proliferation.
Thirdly, the draft reiterated that all states parties have a legal obligation under Article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the nuclear arms race and disarmament. It said the conference deeply regrets the lack of progress on those obligations, citing the continued existence of nuclear arsenals and qualitative improvements in weapons systems.
The document called on nuclear-weapon states to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military doctrine and to pursue unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures aimed at elimination. It also said the United States and the Russian Federation should voluntarily maintain the limitations of the now-expired New START Treaty until a successor arrangement is reached.
Beyond arms reduction, the document noted that nuclear weapons must never be used again and stressed the need for human control over any decision to employ them. It also called for dialogue, transparency, confidence-building measures and regular reporting by nuclear-weapon states on their disarmament commitments.
The document’s disarmament section reflected a familiar but unresolved contradiction at the heart of the NPT: the treaty still depends on the promise of elimination, even as nuclear weapons continue to occupy a central place in the security doctrines of the world’s most powerful states.
